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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Virginia Hill ("Ms. Hill") appeals from a final order of the Second
District Court for Davis County, Honorable Glen R. Dawson presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (3) (j).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Is the Plaintiff/ Attorney entitled to a judgment against Defendant/ Client
under the contingency fee "Legal Services Contract" entered into by the parties for onethird of the attorney fee award granted by the District Court in a separate proceeding, plus
one-third of the whole or primary judgment?
Standard of Review: This court reviews Questions of Law for correctness,
giving no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. FN 1
Issue Preserved in Trial Court: Such issue was preserved through the
various filings of Ms. Hill surrounding the parties' respective motions for summary
judgment (R. 77, 100, 102,110,123).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
The following rule has application in this appeal and is included in the Addendum
due to length:

-

Chapter 13, Rule L5, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Addendum A).

1 Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). See also Emergency Physician's
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 167 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Utah 2007).
1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case: Plaintiff/ Appellee, Don S. Redd ("Mr. Redd") initiated

<

this suit by filing a Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Mr. Redd's primary claim is that
in addition to receiving one-third of a judgment he aided Ms. Redd in obtaining as her
attorney, he is also entitled to one-third of the attorney fees awarded to Ms. Redd in
connection with such judgment.
i
B. Course of Proceedings: The parties each filed a motion for summary judgment,
including a pleading of Stipulated Facts for Joint Motions for Summary Judgment. The
trial court granted Mr. Redd's motion for summary judgment.

,

*

C. Disposition in the Trial Court: On April 20, 2012, the trial court entered its
Memorandum Ruling and Final Order. Ms. Hill filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17,
2012. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals on July 2,
2012. On August 7,2012, the Utah Supreme Court then vacated such transfer and chose
i

to retain this proceeding on its docket.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
n

In the early 1990's Ms. Hill invested monies with certain individuals

and/ or entities, which investment monies were not properly used for the purposes

*l

intended. Demands for the return of her money having gone unanswered, Ms. Hill
eventually retained the services of Mr. Redd, attorney at law, to represent her in an action

2
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to recover her monies. (R. 149)
As a part of securing the services of Mr. Redd a Legal Services Contract (the
"Contract") was drafted by Mr. Redd, and signed by each of the parties on or about
August 29, 1997. (R. 149)
A lawsuit was then filed in August, 1997 by Mr. Redd on behalf of Ms. Hill in the
Fourth District Court for Juab County, against Owen A. Allred and others named in that
proceeding. (R. 149)
Over approximately the next 13 years substantial and various legal proceedings
ensued against the various defendants. Included in these proceedings were three
appeals—two to the Utah Supreme Court and one bankruptcy appeal to the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. Clark Nielsen & Associates handled all of the work for the
bankruptcy appeal, and Mr. Redd and Clark Nielsen & Associates together handled the
work for the Utah Supreme Court appeals. In keeping with the Contract, fees for those
services were fully paid by Ms. Hill separate and apartfromthe contingency fee that
eventually became due for the judgment entered in the other proceedings in the District
Court. (R.149)
Ultimately, a Judgment, and then an Amended Judgment were entered, and then
finally a Second Amended Judgment was entered on April 15,2010 for $6,144,854.79,
plus interest at the rate of 2.41 % per annum until paid in full, whichfinaljudgment
included punitive damages against the defendants and prejudgment interest. (R. 150)
3
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1

Ms. Hill then retained in the spring of 2010 the services of Wall & Wall, Attorneys
at Law, to represent her in proceedings from that point forward, including the remaining

t

issue before the District Court of attorney fees. [The right to attorney fees by Ms. Hill
was granted in one of the Utah Supreme Court opinions, with the case being remanded to
the District Court for a determination of those fees.] After remandfromthe Utah
Supreme Court to the District Court the issue of attorney fees was briefed by each side,
I
argument held, and a decisions was rendered by the District Court that fees should be
based upon an hourly rate charged to Ms. Hill rather than any contingent fee amount for
which she may be responsible to her attorney. (R. 150)

{

Ms. Hill had argued to the Fourth District Court that under Utah case law the
attorney fee should be equal to one-third of the judgment award of $6,144,854.79. The
District Court instead ordered that for purposes of determining attorney fees owed by the
defendants to Mrs. Hill, those fees should be based upon the Lodestar formula requiring
i

that attorney fees be based solely upon an hourly rate charge and not the one-third
contingency formula. Subsequently, affidavits filed by Mr. Redd and Wall & Wall
resulted in fees totaling $593,034.40, which amount was then entered as the attorney fee
judgment by the Fourth District Court, plus interest on that amount at 2.41% per annum
until paid in ML This did not change the fact that Ms. Hill still owed Mr. Redd one-third
•of the initial, primary judgment of $6,144,854.79. (R. 150-151)
Both of these judgments have now been paid in full and a Satisfaction of Judgment
4
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(

has been filed with the Fourth District Court. (R. 151)
It has been Mr. Redd's subjective and personal understanding that he was to
receive one-third of any and all monies paid to Ms. Hill, including one-third of any
attorney fee award. (R. 151)
It has been Ms. Hill's subjective and personal understanding that the contingency
fee applied only to thefinal,primary judgment entered by the court, and that any
subsequent award of attorney fees was to compensate her to the extent of the award for
the contingency fee paid to Mr. Redd. (R. 151)
Except for the Contract there is no evidence showing that at any time there was a
meeting of the minds or mutual understanding by the parties as to the meaning of the
wording in the Contract of, "Attorney is entitled to ONE THIRD (33/13%) of all monies
paid to or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action," as far as
the wording's application to an award of attorney fees by the District Court. There are
no private understandings, side agreements, or other writings evidencing any agreement
for Mr. Redd's fees other than the said Contract. (R. 151)
It is not disputed that the subject Contract was willingly signed by both parties, and
that Mr. Redd is due 33 1/3% of all monies collected on the primary damage award of
$6,144,854.79. (R. 151-152)
It is not disputed that Ms. Hill was obligated to pay all costs for the case, including
cost for the prior appellate proceedings. (R. 152)
5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in awarding Mr. Redd one-third of Ms. Hill's separate
attorney fee award in addition to one-third of Ms. Hill's primary judgment because:
1) The Contract which gave him an interest in Ms. Hill's recovery was ambiguous
and did not specify that he was to share in any separate attorney fee award. The Contract
could reasonably be interpreted, especially by Ms. Hill a laywoman, to only allow Mr.
Redd to share in a portion of the underlying judgment and not any separate award of
attorney fees. In addition, as an attorney and drafter of the Contract, such ambiguity
should be construed exclusively against Mr. Redd.
2) Such an award results in an unreasonable fee. Regardless of what the Contract
states the courts retain the discretion to determine the reasonableness of the fee and the
applicable rules limit such fee to a reasonable amount. The purpose of attorney fee
awards is to compensate the client for the costs they had to incur to obtain the results, thus
making the client whole. Attorney fees are not another avenue for the attorney to be
supplemented or doubly awarded. Such a situation is inherently improper and
unreasonable. Not only did the District court fail to find that Mr. Redd receiving
compensation out of both the primary judgment and separate attorney fees to be
reasonable, the District Court did not even address the issue of reasonableness of this
application of the fee award.
6
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MR. REDD/ATTORNEY A
JUDGMENT AGAINST MS. HILL/ CLIENT UNDER THE CONTINGENCY FEE
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES FOR ONE- THIRD OF THE
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD GRANTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IN A
SEPARATE PROCEEDING, PLUS ONE-THIRD OF THE WHOLE OR PRIMARY
JUDGMENT.
I. The trial court erred in finding that the Contract entered into by the
parties was not ambiguous despite the fact that it can be reasonably understood to
have two or more plausible meanings. Furthermore, such ambiguity should be
construed against Mr. Redd, an attorney and drafter of the ambiguous Contract.
A contract is ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express
the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings.
FN2 In addition, it is the general rule that in construing a contract between attorney and
client, doubts are resolved against the attorney and the construction adopted which is
favorable to the client. FN3
This proceeding hinges around the ambiguous language contained in paragraph two
(2) of the Contract between Mr. Redd and Ms. Hill. Such paragraph reads as follows:
"Attorney agrees to provide legal services in relation to this matter on a contingent
fee basis which is as follows: CLIENT pays NO attorney's fees or costs unless there is
some compensation received from this cause of action. Client will be responsible for all
costs and out-of-pocket expenses such as depositions, filing fees, witness fees etc. from
clients share of settlement proceeds. Attorney is entitled to ONE THIRD (33 l/3%)ofall
monies paid to or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action."
2 Equitable Life & Cos. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.1993).
3 Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone, 789 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
7
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[Emphasis and spellings as in original]
While the Utah appellate courts have yet to specifically address this issue, many of

i

our neighboring states have directly done so. We would like tofirstinvite the court's
attention to the case of Luna v. Gillingham, 789 P.2d 801 (Wash. App. 1990). In that case
the chents filed an action against their attorney claiming that he misrepresented a contingent
fee agreement to them. The plaintiffs had prevailed in their lawsuit and Gillingham
i

requested an award of attorneys fees under the applicable statutes. In his attorney fee
affidavit Gillingham disclosed his agreement to pay a legal clerk (and later bar admitted
attorney), Jennings, $20.00 per hour, and he also informed the court of his own hourly fee.

<

The trial judge awarded attorney fees of $37,977.50, the full amount requested for
Gillingham's and Jennings' time. The judge's oral opinion indicated that the court
contemplated the fee award would apply as a credit against the contingent fee owed by the
plaintiffs.
i

Afterwards Gillingham and Jennings met and decided how to determine the
contingent fee owed by the chents, and they elected to add the attorney fee award to the
base judgment award, and then take the contingent feefromthat total amount because the
language of the contingency agreement awarded Gillingham a percentage of "any gross
recovery"—essentially the same as what Mr. Redd is attempting to do in the instant case. In
Luna, the court construed that fee agreement as being ambiguous because it was not clear
and did not define whether "gross recovery" referenced the judgment for damages alone or
•

8
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the judgment plus court-awarded attorney fees. FN4 Therefore the attorney fees should not
have been added to the gross recovery, but rather should have been applied as a credit
against the contingent fee owed by the plaintiffs to Gillingham under the agreement. FN5
The Luna court observed in its opinion that, like in the instant case,
"The Retainer Agreement does not directly address the issue of what is to be
done with court-awarded attorneys' fees. Gillingham contends, however, that
since it does provide he is to receive a percentage of any 'gross recovery/
there is no ambiguity. He claims that the term 'gross recovery' includes
court-awarded attorneys' fees and that his contingent fee should be computed
by adding the court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs' recovery." FN6
However under the same analysis as Utah courts take on ambiguous contracts, they
determined that it was ambiguous because, under the circumstances, more than one possible
meaning could be attributed to the "gross recovery" language of the retainer agreement,
namely that it would be exclusive of court ordered attorney fees. FN7
This is the same scenario as we are faced with in this case. Mr. Redd's Contract
awards him "ONE THIRD (33 1/3 %) of all monies paid to or in clients behalf for what
ever cause related to this cause of action." However, it does not define whether such
includes any additional awards of attorney fees or not and it can reasonably be interpreted
both ways, particularly in this context of a contingency fee agreement.
The Luna court looked for further direction on this point to Hamilton v. Ford Motor

A Luna, 789 P.2d at 579-80.
5 Id. At 581.
6 Id. At 579.
7 Id. At 580-81.
9
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1

Co. 636 F.2d 745, 748(D.C. Cir. 1980), in which " . . . the court held that the burden be
placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of court-awarded attorneys' fees in the

I

contingent fee agreement." Specifically they found that, "The client expects that the fee
agreement will provide the sole source of income for the attorney. The attorney, on the other
hand, has the technical knowledge and experience to be able to anticipate awards of
attorneys9 fees." FN8
Based upon this line of reasoning the Luna court held that" . . . because Gillingham
failed to provide for allocation of court-awarded attorneys' fees in the contingent fee
agreement, the trial court correctly ruled that the court-awarded attorneys' fees should apply
as a credit to the plaintiffs in computing Gillingham's contingent fee." FN9
Construing such an agreement against the attorney, who was both the drafter and
attorney is in keeping with Utah law, wherein we find that " . . . Any ambiguous term or
provision should be construed against the drafter of the attorney fee agreement." FN 10
From Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 (Utah 1989), a case where the Utah Supreme
Court denied relief to a law firm under a contingent fee agreement that failed to address
subsequent representation by another firm, we find the following pronouncement by our
Supreme Court:

8 Hamilton, 748 F.2d at 749.
9 Luna, 789 P.2dat581.
10 Parents Against Drunk Drivers, 789 P.2d at 56.
10
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i

a

In interpreting the contract, we must be mindful of the general principle
that a court will strictly construe terms in a contract against one who is
"both the attorney draftsman of and a party to the instrument." Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957). We also note that in
the present circumstances, this principle is reinforced by the fact that the
instrument at issue relates to an attorney/client contingent fee arrangement.
The present Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar require
that all contingent fee agreements be in writing. That requirement, which
does not apply to other types of fee arrangements, reflects in part a concern
that contingent fee arrangements are particularly likely to be misunderstood
by clients. That concern is enhanced where the clients are unsophisticated
with respect to legal matters as in the present case. The rule is meant to
ensure that clients will be fully informed as to the terms and consequences
of the contingent fee agreement." FN 11
For further support of Ms. Hill's position in this action, we next call this court's
attention to the matter of Chalmers v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 502 P.2d 1378
(Oregon, 1972). In Chalmers the attorney had entered into a contingent fee agreement
with the clients but the fee agreement failed to state any specific percentage for the
contingency fee. At the same time the insureds' action against the insurer was such that
reasonable attorney fees were available to the prevailing party. There being no
percentage in the fee agreement the court granted a reasonable attorney fee. As is
currently the situation now, the Oregon court had not previously decided how an attorney
fee award should be credited to the amount owed by the client where a contingency fee
agreement was in place between the client and attorney. The Oregon court noted that
absent some specific language in the fee agreement itself the fee distribution terms were

llPM/z>y,768P.2dat451.
11
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ambiguous, the terms being subject to various interpretations.
For example, is the attorney entitled to retain the attorney fee allowed by
the court in addition to the contingent fee payable from the judgment? Or is
the fee allowed by the court to be credited to the client as an offset in
computing how the proceeds of the judgment are to be distributed between
the client and his attorney? Or is the fee allowed by the court to be added
to the amount of the judgment in determining the total amount of recovery
subject to the contingent fee percentage? There may also be other possible
alternatives. FN12
Based upon these circumstances, and the manifest ambiguity in the fee agreement
between the plaintiffs and the attorney, the Oregon Supreme Court held as follows:
We agree that an attorney is free (subject to the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) to negotiate such terms as he and his client
may agree upon with reference to the manner in which awards of attorney
fees under ORS 743.114 may be considered in relation to the amount,
source, and distribution of any contingent fees. In such an event, there is no /
element of surprise or other unfairness to the client. If, however, the
contingent fee agreement makes no specific reference to any possible
attorney fee which may be awarded by the court and makes no specific
provision for the manner in which any such fee is to be considered in
computing the amount, source, and manner of distribution of the contingent
fee, we hold that any attorney fee awarded by the court shall be offset as a
credit for deductionfromthe amount of the agreed contingent fee, as
computed upon the basis of the amount of the judgment. As a result, if the
attorney fee awarded by the court is larger than the contingent fee payable
from the judgment, the attorney5 s compensation would be payable solely
from the attorney fee awarded by the court and the entire amount of the
judgment would be payable to the client. FN13
As an attorney taking a contingent interest in potential awards given to Ms. Hill,
Mr. Redd has the duty to clearly denote in the fee agreement all potential compensation

12 Chalmers, 502 P.2d at 1380.
13 M a t 1381.
12
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factors he considered and fully explain such to his client. His failure to do so is the direct
result of this litigation and he should not be allowed to benefit from his own failure,
particularly not at the great expense to his client.
This would seem to be in keeping with Utah law, wherein it has been announced
that "[a] court will n o t . . . make a better contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves." FN14 The Utah Court in Rio went on to say that, "A court will not enforce
asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." FN 15
The terms of this Contract are vague and ambiguous, and therefore Mr. Redd is
seeking to read into the contract rights and an interpretation that are not supported by the
Contract itself. As an attorney and drafter of such Contract, Mr. Redd should be held to a
higher standard in this regard and such ambiguity should be construed against him and in
favor of Ms. Hill, his laywoman client.
The trial court erred in determining that the Contract was not ambiguous and
seemed to completely ignore the unique contractual relationship in this case - namely it
was not two parties bargaining at arm's length, but one legally trained party with a
fiduciary and ethical duty to the other that failed to define, specify or fully disclose his
interpretation of the agreement they were entering into.
Given that the parties stipulated to the facts leading up to their respective motions

14 Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
15 Id.
13
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for summary judgment, after finding that the Contract is ambiguous and that such should
be construed against Mr. Redd, it would be proper to find as a matter of law that Ms. Hill
is entitled to summary judgment on the underlying petition as prayed for in the District
Court.
II. The trial court erred in failing tofindthat the attorney fees as proposed
by Mr. Redd were unreasonable under the circumstances. In fact, the trial court did
not even address such issue.
Clearly Mr. Redd believes that the Contract is fully controlling, and he cited
Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, et aL, 213 P.3d 13 (Utah App. 2009) to the district court
for that proposition. However, it has long been held that attorney fees are always subject to
review of reasonableness by the court. Kealamakia itself clearly states that"... the district
court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee...-." FN 16
This position stemsfromRule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which
provides in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." The rule then goes into a
variety of factors that may be considered, which factors have been discussed an amplified
by our courts in numerous situations, but the section quoted is the pertinent part for this case
since there is a contingent fee arrangement between the parties in this case.
In a general discussion of rights of an attorney under a fee agreement, it has been
stated that:

16 Kealamakia, 213 P.3d at 15.
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'TSFotwithstanding such statements, however, it has been said that it is
ingrained in the policy of determining reasonable attorney's fees, that no
matter what fee is specified in the contract an attorney is entitled to no more
than a reasonable fee, because an attorney, as a fiduciary, cannot bind his
client to pay a greater compensation for his services than the attorney would
have the right to demand if no contract had been made." [Emphasis added]
FN17
This general rule has been followed in Utah, as well as other jurisdictions. Our Utah
Court of Appeals in Parents Against Drunk Drivers stated, "The existence of an attorney/
client relationship is governed in Utah by both the ethical rules governing attorney
conduct and contract law." FN18 This right of the court to monitor and approve fee
contracts between a client and attorney is one of long standing.
In the case of Gillette v. Newhouse Realty Co..'282 P. 776 (Utah 1929) Gillette, an
attorney, represented Bonneville Hotel Company and performed certain services under a
contract with Bonneville. The defendant Newhouse Realty subsequently purchased
Bonneville and agreed to be responsible for various debts of Bonneville, including debts
related to injuries sustained by guests in an elevator accident. Gillette had contracted with
the hotel company that they would pay him 10% of any amounts the hotel paid to the
injured guests through judgment or compromise, regardless of whether the hotel was
reimbursed any of such funds from the elevator manufacturer or not. The court in Gillette
stated that, "The rale that an attorney may not by his contract of employment place

17 7ACJS. Sec. 307, p. 588
18 Parents Against Drunk Drivers, 789 P.2d at 54.
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himself in a position where his own interests or the interest of another, whom he
represents, conflict with the interests of his client, is founded upon principles of public
policy." FN19
While the facts of Gillette may be compared only somewhat to the instant action,
viz. in the Contract with Ms. Hill, Mr. Redd contracted to receive a portion of monies that
were to go to Ms. Hill to make her whole, the salient point here is that the court retained
the right to deny relief under the contract because the terms were unreasonable and
against public policy. Thus, the contract was not ipso facto enforceable by the attorney,
but subject to review by the court for reasonableness and fairness.
This same right to monitor fee contracts has been following in many other local
jurisdictions, hi Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P.2d 260 (Colo. App. 1976), the Colorado
Court of Appeals dealt with a situation where a contingent fee agreement provided for a
one-third fee in a situation where the plaintiff suing the attorney alleged that the fee was
excessive in light of the work performed. The court agreed, ruling that "[u]nder its
general supervisory power over attorneys as officers of the court, a court may and should
scrutinize contingent fee contracts and determine the reasonableness of the terms
thereof." FN20 While we do not dispute the extent of work Mr. Redd performed, nor his
right to one-third of a judgment exceeding $6 million dollars, we feel that anything

19 Gillette, 282 P. at 779.
20 Anderson, 547 P.2d at 261.
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beyond that is clearly excessive, unreasonable, and subject to review by the court.
At this juncture we would like to come back again to Rule 1.5 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and its application as to reasonableness of fees. In the Matter of
Struthers, 877 P.2d 789 (Ariz. 1994), the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with a variety of
issues concerning an attorney's dealings with his client, but one issue the court felt deserved
particular attention involved a situation where the attorney in the case had a contingencyfee
agreement that contracted for the attorney to take from the judgment his contingency fee
PLUS any court awarded attorney fee. (This is one of the possible outcomes observed as
possible interpretations in the Oregon and Washington court rulings cited above.) The
Arizona court ruled as follows:
"Such an arrangement would tend to mislead the awarding court as to
Strutters' fee agreement, because a court would not award attorney's fees if it
knew that the award would result in double recovery for the attorney and no
benefit to the client The purpose of awarding fees to a successful litigant is
not to provide the lawyer with a double payment bonus but to defray the
client's litigation expenses." [Emphasis added.] FN21
While this is seemingly a stricter standard than the Washington or Oregon courts
took, we submit that it is the correct position to be taken on as issue such as is presented
to the Court in this case. While there certainly should be no wrongdoing attached to Mr.
Redd in drafting his agreement as there was in the Arizona case, the central issue still
resolves around the right of the courts to determine a correct fee. As the Oregon court

21 Struthersf 877 P.2d at 795.
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noted in Chalmers, no blame should attach to the attorney in that case because the Oregon
court had never ruled on the efficacy of a contingency fee contract that provided for the

<

attorney taking the contingency fee plus some portion of the attorney fee award granted
by the lower court. We find no Utah cases directly on point for this issue.
However, as the Arizona court went on to state in Struthers the whole concept of
awarding attorney fees in any case is "to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation
i

to establish a just claim or as a just defense." FN22 As Struthers observed, such a fee
arrangement is "inherently improper." FN23 If the attorney fee award is to help make
the litigating party whole, then any time an attorney takes any portion of that fee award in
addition to the contingency amount the fee is no longer a fee to compensate the litigating
party but to some varying degree a bonus for the attorney. Thus, the fee no longer is
attorney fees, but attorney's fees. This was never the intention when such an award was
created by the courts and legislatures.
This, contrary to Mr. Redd's assertions, is also what we believe to be the proper
interpretation Kealamakia. In that case the plaintiff corporation sued members of the
Kealamakia family for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
conversion of corporate assets. The district court found that William and Nadine
Kealamakia_were liable for actual damages of $196,047.01, awarded punitive damages of

22 Id.
23 Id
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$35,000.00, and awarded attorney fees. A judgment against Joseph Kealamakia was also
granted for $36,403.10. A subsequent order set the amounts of the attorney fees,
providing that "(1) the contingency fee agreement amount of 40% was the maximum
amount that Plaintiff could recover in an attorney fee award, and (2) the 40% figure-$134,743.44—was a reasonable attorney fee under the circumstances

" FN24

The defendants argued that it was improper to award attorney fees because of the
contingency fee agreement which provided that the fee is to come out of the "total gross
recovery." Defendants argued that a separate attorney fee award rewrites the contract,
with which contention the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed. The Kealamakia court then
stated as follows:
"First, we note that Defendants' characterization of the language of the
contingency fee agreement is incorrect. The agreement simply provides
that Plaintiff must compensate its attorneys by paying them "40% of gross
amounts recovered." There is no language that would require that amount
to be paidfromrecovery as opposed to being paidfroma separate award of
attorney fees. Indeed, the agreement contemplates the possibility that such
a separate award may be granted where it states, "In no event will you
compensate us less than the amount of any attorney fees awarded by the
Court." [Emphasis added.] FN25
Several paragraphs later the Utah Court of Appeals follows with this language:
"The trial court's award of attorney fees to Plaintiff does not alter the contract
between Plaintiff and its attorneys in any way. Rather, Plaintiff remains
obligated to pay its attorneys according to the terms of the contingency fee
agreement. The fact that the money will come in the form of a separate
award, allowing Plaintiff to be made whole, does not change any rights or
24 Kealamakia, 213 P.3dat 14.
25 Id. zt\5.
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obligations provided for in the contract." [Emphasis added.] FN26
It is here that Ms. Hill diverges with Mr. Redd in his interpretation of Kealamakia.
Mr. Redd in this instant action takes the position that Kealamakia stands, in part, for the
proposition that an attorney is entitled to whatever his fee contract may provide, and if it
provides for a recoveryfromthe gross recovery then that includes the attorney fee award as
well, even if it does not specify such. Kealamakia makes no such holding. There is nothing
whatsoever in the case to indicate that the attorneys for plaintiff sought to recover 40% of
the base recovery PLUS 40% of the separate $134,743.44 attorney fee award granted by the
district court. If such an issue ever arose between the parties it is not in any way manifested
in the appellate court ruling. Indeed, what we do see in the ruling is that the separate
attorney fee award was granted for the purpose of "... allowing Plaintiff to be made
whole" [Emphasis added]. FN27 This necessarily imphes that the attorneys were not going
to receive anythingfromthe primary judgment. .This is further emphasized by Kealamakia
wherein it is stated that "... we recognize the public policy that the basic purpose of
attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing party and not to punish the losing party by
allowing the winner a windfall profit." FN28
In the instant action if Mr. Redd takes a percentage of the attorney fee award in
addition to a percentage of the base judgment then he is thwarting the purpose of the award,

26 Id. at 15-16.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 17.
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that being to make the party/ client whole. The attorney fee award is for the party who
incurred a bill with an attorney, not the attorney. If Ms. Hill would not have been awarded
attorney fees, Mr. Redd still would be compensated through the primary judgment, he had
no risk with respect to the separate attorney fee award. If Mr. Redd is awarded a share then
the attorney fee award becomes a bonus to him, and the attorney fee award becomes an
award for the benefit of Mr. Redd and not as compensating Ms. Hill for the costs she
incurred by having to bring the suit. That is not the purpose of attorney fees. "Attorney fee
awards are means to 'vindicate personal claims' rather than means to 'generate fees.5"
FN29 .
Along this same line of thinking the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that a "reasonable" fee is one that is to be a "fully compensatory fee." FN30
For a fee to be fully compensatory the attorney representing the party should not be
entitled to a share of that fee on top of a contingency fee already paid. If the attorney is
so allowed, then the fee is neither fully compensatory nor reasonable.
It is well understood that ". . . a statutory fee award is separate from the plaintiffs
recovery." FN31 We reiterate that an attorney fee award is an effort to make the client
whole as much as possible—to compensate to some degree for the fees paid by the client to

29 Id. citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375
(Utah 1996).
30 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,425 (1983).
31 Warnell, et al v. Ford Motor Co., et al, 205 F.Supp.2d 956, 960 (No. Dist 111. 2002).
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his or her attorney. It is not intended as an additional source of funds for the attorney in a
contingency fee case. "Fees awarded out of a common fund are a substitute for, not a

<

supplement to, a contingent fee." FN32
In the Warnell v. Ford Motor Co, case an award of $9 million was given to the
plaintiffs' class, and an additional $3 million was awarded to cover all fees and costs. Issues
developed over whether the attorneys for plaintiffs were entitled to enforce a contingency fee
agreement with some of the members of the classfromthe $9 million in addition to the $3
million awarded for just such fees. This resulted, in part, in a characterization by the court of
the attorney fees sought by the attorneys as being "double dipping." FN33 As the court
noted in Warnell the award would not have been approved had the court known that the
attorneys sought both the statutory attorney fee plus the contingency fee out of the underlying
judgment. In examining the fees being sought by the attorneys the court in Warnell noted
that, "This is all by way of saying that I would nfever have approved a settlement that required
the named plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of their attorneys1 fees to a significantly greater
extent than the rest of the class where the class got a significantly greater benefit. The total
fees collected are thus unreasonable." Emphasis added. FN34

x

While it is true that Warnell was a situation where the attorneys were entitled to the

33 J i at 962.

34/*
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award of the court of attorney fees, the court held the attorneys were NOT entitled to a
contingency on the primary award. They were not entitled to both. The facts are flipped in
this case but we submit that the principle holds true for this case as well—the attorney is not
entitled to both the court awarded attorney fees in addition to the contingency amount on the
primary judgment, particularly when the fee agreement does not specifically delineate such.
We again emphasize that the principle behind awarding an attorney's fee is to
compensate the client, not the attorney. In the U.S. Supreme Court case ofCity of Burlington
v. Ernest Dague, SR., et al, 505 U.S. 557 (1992), the Court observed that"... this Court
consistently has recognized that a "reasonable fee is to be a fully compensatory fee, and is to
be calculated on the basis of rates and practices prevailing in the relevant market." FN35
Clearly a fee charged against both the principle judgment plus a portion of the attorney fee
award does not result in a "full compensatory fee" since it merely enhances the standard
contingent fee already being charged by the attorney at the sole expense of the client.
As this court is well aware, attorney's fees are to be reasonable. Rule 1.5(a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct in part provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make an
agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for
expenses." The Rule then goes on to list the various factors generally considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee. As an example where the factors were
considered we cite this court to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Blanchard v. Bergeraon,

35 Burlington, 505 U.S. at 567.
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et al., 489 U.S. 87 (1989), wherein the court held that in determining whether a fee is
reasonable, the court should look at the "time expended on a matter," plus the following

<

factors:
"(1) the time and labor; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations (8) the amount involved and results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases." FN36
In this case it is the position of Mr. Redd that the fee agreement provision
providing that the "[a]ttomey is entitled to ONE THIRD (33 1/3%) of all monies paid to
or in clients behalf for what ever cause related to this cause of action" entitles him to onethird of the attorney fee award. This is neither reasonable, nor was it ever the
understanding of Ms. Hill that she would be paying anything more than one-third of any
base judgment awarded due to the cause of action filed. Any attorney fees awarded were
to compensate her to some degree to the large one-third fee Mr. Redd would be receiving
if they prevailed. Despite the fact that the original District Court found that a
"reasonable" attorney fee for Ms. Hill was only $593,034.40, Ms. Hill has not even
attempted to limit Mr. Redd's fee to such amount. Conversely, she has comphed with the
terms of the Contract and provided Mr. Redd with an attorney fee of more than two

36 Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 91-92.
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million dollars ($2,000,000.00), an amount that results in more than triple what Mr. Redd
would have received by charging his hourly rate alone. Even if Mr. Redd does not
receive the additional approximately $200,000.00 he is seeking in this proceeding, he has
already been more than compensated. On the other hand, the untouched $593,034.40
attorney fee award does not even come close to making Ms. Hill whole - in the realm of
attorney fees she is already sitting at over a 1.4 million dollar deficit.
Under such a scenario the District Court could not have correctly found that Mr.
Redd sharing in the separate attorney fee award was reasonable. Compounding such error
is the fact that the District Court did not even address such factor in awarding Mr. Redd
the unreasonable fee.
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in awarding Mr. Redd one-third of Ms. Hill's separate
attorney fee award in addition to one-third of Ms. Hill's primary judgment because the
Contract which gave him an interest in Ms. Hill's recovery was ambiguous and did not
specify that he was to share in any such attorney fee award. The Contract could
reasonably be interpreted, especially by Ms. Hill a laywoman, to only allow Mr. Redd to
share in a portion of the underlying judgment and not any separate award of attorney fees.
In addition, as an attorney and drafter of the Contract, such ambiguity should be
construed exclusively against Mr. Redd.
Moreover, even if the Contract was not ambiguous, such an award results in an
25
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unreasonable fee under the circumstances. Regardless of what the Contract states the
courts retain the discretion to determine the reasonableness of the fee and the applicable
rules limit such fee to a reasonable amount. The purpose of attorney fee awards is to
compensate the client for the costs they had to incur to obtain the results, thus making the
client whole. Attorney fees are not another avenue for the attorney to be supplemented or
doubly awarded. Such a situation is inherently improper and unreasonable. The attorney
fee award already does not even come close to making Ms. Hill whole, further
diminishing such compensation is completely unreasonable under the circumstances. Not
only did the District court fail to find that Mr. Redd receiving fees out of both the primary
judgment and separate attorney fees to be reasonable, the District Court did not even
address the issue of reasonableness.

r

For the aforementioned reasons the District Court's order should be overturned
and Ms. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
RESPECTFULLLY SUBMITTED t h i s s 3 / ^ y of October, 2012.

l,aP.C.
iey for Defendant/Appellant
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Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13
Rule 1.5. Fees.
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(a)(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(a)(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(a)(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(a)(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(a)(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(a)(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(a)(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(a)(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which
the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes
in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or
other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall
state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal;
litigation and other expenses to be deductedfromthe recovery; and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The
agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be
liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent
fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the
outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and
the method of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect:
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(d)(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or
property settlement in lieu thereof; or

<

(d)(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only
if:
i

(e)(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each
lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(e)(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive,
and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and(e)(3) the total fee is reasonable.
Comment
Reasonableness of Fee and Expenses
[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the
circumstances. The factors specified in (a)(1) through (a)(8) are not exclusive. Nor will
each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for
which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement
for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses
incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to
which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects
the cost incurred by the lawyer.
Basis or Rate of Fee
[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved
an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the
client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding
as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Generally, it is desirable to furnish
the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer's customary fee
arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis,
rate or total amount of the fee and whether and to what extent the client will be
responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation.
A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of
misunderstanding.
[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of
paragraph (a) of this Rule. In detenriining whether a particular contingent fee is
reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer
must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may
impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or
may require a lawyer to offer clients an alternative basis for the fee. Applicable law also
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may apply to situations other than a contingent fee, for example, government regulations
regarding fees in certain tax matters.
Terms of Payment
[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee but is obligated to return any
unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for
services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve
acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the
litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may
be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential
qualities of a business transaction with the client.
[5] An agreement may not be made whose terms might induce the lawyer improperly to
curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest.
For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be
provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services
probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client.
Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a
proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of
the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily
on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.
Prohibited Contingent Fees
[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyerfromcharging a contingent fee in a domestic
relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the
amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does
not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the
recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders
because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns.
Division of Fees
[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers
who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one
lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well, and most often is
used when the fee is contingent and the division is between a referring lawyer and a trial
specialist. Paragraph (e) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the
proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the
representation as a whole. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including
the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing.
Contingent fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client and must otherwise
comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule. Joint responsibility for the representation entails
financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated
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in a partnership. A lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring
lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.
[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future
for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.
Disputes over Fees
[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an
arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer must comply with
the procedure when it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should
conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining
a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a
person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled
to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should
comply with the prescribed procedure.
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"SECOND
niRTRICTCOURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM RULING & FINAL
ORDER

DON S. REDD,
Plaintiff,
'•" v s .

:

•*

i*

Case No.: 110702023
VIRGINIA HILL,
Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON
Defendant

This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. The Court
having thoroughly reviewed the case file and pertinent legal authorities makes the following
Ruling.
Background
The dispute in this case arises from a disagreement between the parties as to the extent to
which a contingency fee agreerneiit affects the award of Attorney's fees in Virginia Hill v. Owen
Allred, et al^ Case No. 970400153. It is not disputed that a contingency fee agreement was
willingly signed by both parties and that Plaintiff is entitled to 33 1/3% of an award to Defendant
of $6,144,854.79. The only dispute before the Court is whether Plaintiff should receive,
pursuant to the contingency fee agreement, a further award of 33 1/3% from the $593,034.40
awarded for attorney's fees.

1
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Analysis
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
this case, the parties have submitted a stipulated set of undisputed facts. Accordingly, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the Court may make a judgment as a matter of law.
In general, "fee agreements between lawyers and clients should be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that they are fair..." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawsonr92} P.2d
1366,1372 (Utah 1996). When "construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts are
resolved against the attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client." Id.
This rule often applies in cases where a fee agreement is alleged to contain an ambiguity. Id. A
contract is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Glenn v. Reese, 2009
UT 80, K 10,225 P.3d 185 (quoting Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Giffbrd-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27,
\ 25,207 P.3d 1235). If the language of the contract is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law." Id.
The specific language of the fee agreement at issue states, "[a]ttorney is entitled to ONE
THIRD (33 1/3 %) of all monies paid to or in clients behalf for what ever [sic] cause related to
this cause of action." In this Court's view the language in the fee agreement is unambiguous, it
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applies the contingency fee to all money paid to the client for whatever cause. The plain
meaning of the contingency fee agreement is that the 33 1/3% would apply to any award or
judgment, whether for general damages, punitive damages, or attorney's fees. As the language is
clear, the only possible interpretation is that Plaintiff should receive 33 1/3% of the $593,034.40
in attorney's fees awarded to Defendant in the prior action.
For tlieforgoingreasons, Plaintiff's motionforsummary judgment is granted and
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Final Order
Based on the foregoing ruling, IT IS HEREBY ORDRED that Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED in its entirety and Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED.
It is FURTHERED ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded a Declaratory Judgment in the
amount of 33 1/3% of the $593,034.40 in attorney's fees awarded in Virginia Hill v. Owen
Alfred, et al, Case No. 970400153. This Order and Judgment is a final order and no additional
order is necessary.
Dated this l ( ^ u day of April 2012.
BY THE COURT:

>^^^^.C)<3a
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Ruling and
Final Order this / "

day of April 2012, postage prepaid, to the following:

Stephen I. Oda, Esq.
44 N. Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
Gregory B. Wall, Esq.
Cory R. Wall, Esq.
Wall & Wall PC
2168 East Fort Union Blvd.
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
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